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ABSTRACT
Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) not only seek to influence public policies
with (re-)distributive implications to attract voters; they also try to reshape
economic governance to weaken their opponents. We develop a theoretical
model suggesting that the institutional reform strategies of PRRPs depend in
large part on the degree of Social democratic party–union ties. When
organizational ties between centre-left parties and trade unions are strong,
PRRPs are protagonists of attacks on institutional union power and unite with
centre-right parties in alternating long-term power relationships. By contrast,
when Social democratic party–union ties are weak, PRRPs turn into
consenters to the centre-right’s institutional reform proposals and act in
accordance with short-term electoral and coalitional concerns. We research
our argument in two primary case studies of Austria and Denmark, and
control for alternative explanations with reviews of the institutional reform
agendas pursued by radical right parties in Sweden and Germany.
KEYWORDS Institutional reform; labour market policy; populism; radical right parties; trade unions;
welfare state
Introduction
Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have increasingly gained access to gov-
ernment offices as junior partners in majority coalitions or as the parliamen-
tary base of support for minority coalitions and made significant imprints on
social and economic policy developments (Afonso, 2015; Rathgeb, 2021; Röth
et al., 2018). We research an additional dimension of the politics of the radical
right by asking how PRRPs influence institutional reforms of corporatist struc-
tures that entrench trade unions in economic governance.
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Whereas the centre-right typically attacks the institutional power resources of
trade unions to facilitate cutbacks in unemployment insurance (Jensen, 2014,
chapter 4), we argue that the institutional reform strategies of the radical
right rest in large part on the degree of Social democratic party–union ties. As
trade unions provide support to the radical right’s main competitor for the
working-class vote when the link between the industrial and political wing of
the labour movement is strong, PRRPs are incentivized to adopt a consistent
strategy that challenges institutional union power. In this situation, PRRPs and
centre-right parties share a common reform agenda at the expense of organized
labour. Those power-strategic incentives are reduced, however, if that party–
union link has weakened over time. In this situation, PRRPs are less focused
on disempowering trade unions in the long-run and instead influence insti-
tutional reforms in dependence of short-term electoral and coalitional concerns.
This means they put constraints on the centre-right when attacks on institutional
union power may turn electorally unpopular among working-class voters, but
they give in to such reforms when this is not the case in order to keep the gov-
erning coalition intact. Drawing on Korpi’s conceptual distinction (2006), PRRPs
are thus protagonists of attacks on union power when Social democratic party–
union ties are strong, whereas they are consenters to union-hostile reforms when
the party–union link has weakened over time.
We evaluate empirically this theoretical proposition in a comparative analy-
sis of the strategies of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People’s
Party (DF) toward the corporatist regulation of social policies and labour market
programs. The selection of Austria and Denmark as primary cases allows us to
keep constant a number of relevant variables. Yet, we review in addition two
secondary cases of PRRPs – the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna (SD) and
German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – to control for the possible
influence of party patronage and party status (i.e., mainstream vs. challenger
status in party system). Our analysis reveals that PRRPs pursue institutional
strategies in consistency with our theoretical propositions. We urge, conse-
quently, for additional analyses of the radical right’s institutional reform strat-
egies in advanced capitalist democracies, building on the theoretical premises
that the behaviour of these parties is also determined by the relationship
between Social democratic parties and trade unions.
Literature review
Looking at an earlier generation of this party family, Ignazi (1992) argued that
PRRPs have a neoliberal ideological outlook primarily for power-strategic
reasons. By dismantling coordinated welfare systems, labour market protec-
tions, and state-owned industries, they wanted to weaken the power
resources of established parties and interest groups embedded in these
arrangements (see also Betz, 1993, p. 418).
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Kitschelt and McGann (1995) found that neoliberalism would also form a
part of the radical right’s electoral winning formula, as it resonated with
the demands of the petite bourgeoisie in particular. However, as of the
1990s, the ongoing shift of working-class voters towards PRRPs in an age
of de-industrialization and globalization called into question the continued
electoral appeal of neoliberalism (e.g., Arzheimer, 2013; Kitschelt, 2007). A
number of studies argue that the radical right has therefore shifted from a
free-market approach during the 1970s and 1980s to a pro-welfare approach
targeted at native citizens since the 1990s (e.g., Afonso, 2015; Betz & Meret,
2013; Lefkofridi & Michel, 2017; Röth et al., 2018). The ensuing pro-welfare
orientation of the radical right has, however, catered primarily to the social
needs of labour market insiders that are considered to be hard-working
‘makers’ in the eyes of the radical right (Rathgeb, 2021), which may inform
a pro-elderly bias in social policy more broadly (Busemeyer et al., 2021).
Hence, existing scholarships on the radical right focus in particular on the
electoral strategies and policy positions of these parties. By contrast, we zoom
in on an additional dimension of the politics of the radical right, namely their
institutional reform strategies and related impacts on trade union power. On
the one hand, PRRPs could fall back on populist appeals of the past by disem-
powering established parties and interest groups in corporatist institutional
structures. A policy of trade union disempowerment might have an enduring
insurgent quality against the ‘political class’ in corporatist economies. On the
other hand, the selective pro-welfare outlook observed in the literature could
render themmore accommodating towards existing institutional settings. We
submit in the next section the argument that the strategies developed by
radical right parties crucially depend on the strength of the alliance
between Social democratic parties and trade unions.
The radical right and institutional union power
In this paper, we focus on institutional reforms, defined as re-allocations of
political authority that help intentional actors into positions from which
they can shape the political economy over the long run (Knight, 1992;
Moe, 1990). For example, if a political party can boost the power of an interest
group with whom it shares policy preferences, it has institutionalized these
interests, which may bias the course of public policy development and
build in a shield of protection against the power holders of tomorrow
(Moe, 1990). Institutional reforms do rarely have immediate policy impli-
cations in the sense of changing directly the generosity of welfare programs,
but they alter program structures, redistribute institutional benefits and affect
the policy-making capacity of political actors (Klitgaard et al., 2015).
While the literature emphasizes the policy motivations for institutional
reforms, we believe that also electoral motivations play a role for such
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reforms. Distinct political parties may indeed advance their policy interests
through the instalment of affiliated interest groups in particular institutional
arrangements (policy-seeking). The same interest groups may also provide
financial, political and organizational support, which allows affiliated political
parties to advance their electoral interests (vote-seeking) and in return
protect the interest group’s preferred institutional set-up (Allern et al., 2007).
In coordinated market economies, corporatist institutions have tradition-
ally integrated employer associations and trade unions with ties to estab-
lished political parties of the political left and right. PRRPs emerged as
challenger parties that are not well entrenched in this power structure
(Ignazi, 1992; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). While this challenger status had
led them to call for the dismantling of institutions administered by estab-
lished parties and interest groups in the 1970s and 1980s (Betz, 1993;
Ignazi, 1992), we argue that today their reform strategies crucially depend
on the strength of the link between trade unions and Social democratic
parties. We develop this argument by theorizing the institutional reform pre-
ferences of PRRPs, before dealing with their likely policy actions when assum-
ing government responsibility with centre-right parties.
The institutional reform preferences of PRRPs
Where Social democratic party–union ties are strong, trade unions provide
organizational, political and financial support to the radical right’s main com-
petitor for the working-class vote (Allern et al., 2017). As a result, they are
likely to use their institutionalized entrenchment to form coalitions with
their parliamentary allies while trying to veto reform initiatives and the
success of radical right parties more generally. This helps explain why union-
ized working-class voters are still significantly less likely to vote for the radical
right than their non-unionized colleagues (Mosimann et al., 2019). Despite an
overall decline in associational power, trade unions can constitute a well-
informed, intense and organized opposition when incorporated in insti-
tutional decision-making structures (Pierson, 1996). Hence, if the institutional
setting incorporates trade unions loyal to Social democratic parties, PRRPs are
incentivized to promote reforms that weaken the institutional positions held
by trade unions, with negative implications on their policymaking capacity
and ability to support the political left in the long term.
PRRPs may legitimize this strategy by drawing on populist appeals, which
emphasize the growing distance between ‘the people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’,
and by claiming that they are the only ones representing the general will of
the people (volonté générale) (Mudde, 2004). The decline in voter attach-
ments to the two arms of the labour movement creates opportunities for
PRRPs to legitimize a policy of union disempowerment in these terms
(Afonso, 2013). More importantly, PRRPs have so far formed coalitions only
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with centre-right parties whose preferences are aligned with the policy
demands of employer associations in industrial relations and labour market
policy (Jensen, 2014). They would therefore face little coalitional constraints
if their first-best preference were to disempower trade unions.
While strong Social democratic party–union ties should lead PRRPs to
undermine the power resources of trade unions, we propose that PRRPs
have reduced incentives to challenge union power when Social democratic
party–union ties are weak. In this context, PRRPs have little reason to fear
that trade unions form an unbreakable alliance with Social democratic
parties that systematically excludes them (Anthonsen & Lindvall, 2009). As
trade unions no longer circumvent open negotiations by lobbying their
Social democratic allies directly, they take a more open approach to other
parties, including those of the radical right. In fact, this setting can allow
PRRPs and trade unions to discover common grounds – for example on the
issue of labour immigration. While the former have a principled opposition
to immigration for ideological reasons in the parliamentary arena, the latter
want limits in labour supply for power-strategic reasons in the industrial
relations arena. PRRPs and trade unions are also likely to share a common
interest in resisting welfare cuts in pension policy, especially when they
target blue-collar workers with long contribution records (Afonso, 2015). As
a result, the strategy PRRPs develop is primarily conditioned by short-term
electoral and coalitional concerns, which we specify in more detail below.
The institutional reform actions of PRRPs
PRRPs usually govern with the centre-right (Bale et al., 2010), so we need to
specify how PRRPs differ from centre-right parties for a theory of partisan
impact on institutional union power. As Jensen (2014) shows, centre-right
parties typically attack trade unions in order to facilitate cutbacks in unem-
ployment insurance, which is in line with their electoral support base and
affiliated employer associations. When Social democratic party–union ties
are strong, PRRPs and centre-right parties should form a united front that
shares a common interest in attacks on union power.
So how does the radical right differ from the centre-right when Social
democratic party–union ties have become weaker over time? To address
this question, we draw on the conceptual distinction developed by Korpi
(2006, p. 182) between protagonists, consenters and antagonists, and specify
how we identify these types of actors in operational and sequential terms.
In our context, protagonists refer to political parties that initiate attacks on
union power through agenda-setting and thus achieve their first-order pre-
ference once a reduction in institutional union power is legislated. Empiri-
cally, we would thus observe a protagonist if a political party voiced
demands and proposals for reducing institutional union power when in
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 5
opposition, which indicates a first-order preference for attacks against trade
unions. By contrast, consenters lack a clear position when in opposition and
may demand concessions in return for their parliamentary support on union-
hostile reform proposals initiated by protagonists. Empirically, we would thus
expect consenters to react to institutional reform proposals previously intro-
duced by other parties, leading to an acceptance or modification of attacks
on union power.
In a situation of relaxed party–union ties, we expect only centre-right
parties to be protagonists of attacks on union power through initial
agenda setting (Jensen, 2014), whereas PRRPs are likely to be consenters
that may demand modifications to initial reform proposals. Without a long-
term interest in union disempowerment, the main reason why PRRPs
should give in to the centre-right without calling for concessions is to keep
the governing coalition intact (office-seeking). If that, however, comes at
the prize of upsetting working-class voters, they are more likely to seek a
partial alignment with trade unions and put a constraint on the centre-
right (vote-seeking). This calculation clearly distinguishes PRRPs from
centre-right parties, as the former competes with the centre-left for
working-class voters, whereas the latter mobilizes managers and employers
(Oesch & Rennwald, 2018).
Unlike in policies of welfare retrenchment, the radical right’s choice
between a vote-seeking behaviour (i.e., resisting welfare cuts to retain
working-class voters) and an office-seeking behaviour (i.e., consenting to
welfare cuts to stay in government) does not necessarily pose a strategic
dilemma in institutional reform. In pension policy, Afonso (2015) shows that
PRRPs may betray their voters by giving in on welfare cuts or betray their
centre-right coalition partner by resisting those cuts. However, voters not
always care about institutional reforms (Klitgaard et al., 2015), which allows
PRRPs to consent to centre-right parties while prioritizing their main issue
of immigration control. This is in line with Röth et al. (2018) who show that
liberalizing reforms with PRRPs in government prevail mainly in regulatory
domains that are too technical and complex to gain high levels of issue sal-
ience. But when the distributive implications of institutional reforms are more
obvious to the public, PRRPs cannot afford ignoring the preferences of their
new electoral stronghold, namely (male) blue-collar workers.
To sum up, PRRPs retain their original anti-establishment impetus against
elite collusion in corporatist economies (Betz, 1993; Ignazi, 1992) only when
Social democratic parties are still strongly linked to trade unions. As PRRPs
become more mainstream and form coalitions with centre-right parties
while centre-left parties and trade unions distance themselves from each
other, their power-strategic calculation behind attacks on union power
loses relevance. We thus argue that the stronger the organizational ties
between Social democratic parties and trade unions, the stronger the
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incentive for PRRPs to attack institutional union power. In the next section of
the paper, we introduce and explain our strategy of researching the proposed
theoretical claims empirically.
Case selection and method
Following a most-similar systems design, we research empirically the strat-
egies of PRRPs in social policy and labour market related institutional
reforms in two main cases: Austria and Denmark. We review in addition
two secondary cases – Sweden and Germany – to control for alternative
explanations based on party patronage and party status (mainstream vs. chal-
lenger parties). Austria and Denmark both run highly coordinated capitalist
economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) in which the interest group system typically
have had strong traits of social corporatism (Katzenstein, 1985). The power of
trade unions, despite a significant decline since the 1980s, remains relatively
high from an international comparative perspective, even if the sources of
high levels of union power are different (Gordon, 2015). Austrian unions
display the highest levels of concentration and centralization, which allows
the peak confederation, the ÖGB, to speak with one voice on behalf of the
whole workforce collectively, whereas density rates have dramatically
declined to medium levels from an international perspective (Traxler & Per-
nicka, 2007). By contrast, their Danish counterparts feature the highest
levels of density rates in the OECD (together with Sweden), but with three
different peak confederations (LO, FTF, AC) they have lower levels of concen-
tration and centralization, implying a fragmentation of union power (LO and
FTF merged not before 2019). In addition, the Austrian Chamber of Labour
(BAK) is another distinct source of union power by acting as the ÖGB’s
think-tank and individual service organization in representing the whole
workforce due to mandatory membership in corporatist parity bodies such
as the social insurance and the public employment service. The Austrian
Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People’s Party (DF) are both well-estab-
lished and electorally successful PRRPs that since the early 2000s have
taken significant steps away from the fringe of the party system to become
either the junior partner in government coalitions (FPÖ) or the pivotal base
of support for a dependent minority government (DF). The FPÖ and DF
have thus had several opportunities to reveal institutional preferences and
transmit them into action in rounds of institutional reforms.
Apart from these similarities, with the selection of Austria and Denmark,
we include a high-level and a low-level case of Social democratic party–
union ties – our explanatory variable (Allern et al., 2017, see also Appendix).
Given the dominance of the Social democratic faction (FSG, Fraktion Sozialde-
mokratarischer Gewerkschafter) in the Austrian union confederation, ‘[t]here
are enduring, extensive, and intensive party–union links that make Austria
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different’, including ‘overlapping structures, inter-organizational links that are
reciprocal and durable, as well as many others that are occasional’ (Luther,
2017, p. 91). By contrast, party–union ties in Denmark have become ‘quite
distant’ over time (Allern et al., 2007). In 1995-96, the Social democratic
party and the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (LO-Denmark) decided
respectively to abolish mutual representation in each other’s governing
bodies (Bille, 1998). In 2002, LO-Denmark decided furthermore to suspend
its annual financial contribution and removed any reference to the Social
democratic party in its constitution. The other two union confederations
have emphasized non-partisanship ever since. Denmark is thus a case of
party–union ties that have weakened significantly since at least the 1980s
(Allern et al., 2007).
The difference in the party–union linkage in the two countries should
incentivize the FPÖ to turn into a protagonist of a long-term attack on
trade unions and the DF into a consenter to such reform in dependence of
short-term electoral and coalitional concerns. Table 1 illustrates the most
similar systems logic that has guided our case-selection.
Adopted institutional strategies could in theory be affected by the fact that
the FPÖ has held government portfolios in majority coalitions, whereas the
DF only served as parliamentary support for a minority coalition, and may
have identified policy spaces for cooperation with other parties and
consent to union-preferences. Yet, on the possible effect of being govern-
ment or support party, we are inclined to assume that parties in government
are more likely to compromise and consent as they cannot engage politically
without providing solutions and commit to enacting appropriate decisions
(Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010, p. 261–262). Parties outside govern-
ments have more degrees of freedom to pursue rigorous strategies consist-
ently and are not to the same extent forced to compromise.
We control for additional alternative explanations and evaluate the exter-
nal validity of the proposed argument by matching our primary analysis of
PRRPs in Austria and Denmark with reviews of two secondary cases: the
Swedish Sverigedemokraterna (SD) and the German Alternative für
Table 1. Overview of most similar systems design.
Austria Denmark
Interest intermediation Social corporatism Social corporatism
Varieties of capitalism Coordinated Coordinated
Right-wing populist parties FPÖ since 1986 (junior coalition
partner: 2000-2006; 2017-2019)
DF since 1995 (support party:
2001-2011; 2015-2019)
Union power High High





Protagonist of attack on unions Consenter to attacks on unions
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Deutschland (AfD). Drawing on Allern et al. (2017), Social democratic party–
union ties remain strong in Sweden, but not in Germany (see Figure 1 in
Appendix). This allows for a control of the possibility that the union-hostile
approach of the FPÖ is caused by the incorporation of Austria’s labour move-
ment into a cartelized political establishment that excludes the FPÖ from
institutionalized party patronage (Treib, 2012). In this logic, the absence of
party patronage in Denmark would make the DF align with inherited insti-
tutional legacies. If, however, party–union ties rather than the party patron-
age argument is correct, we expect the Swedish SD to turn into a
protagonist and resemble the strategy of the FPÖ despite the absence of
an Austrian-like party cartel in Sweden. Conversely, weaker Social democratic
party–union ties in Germany should make a union-hostile reform agenda less
likely in the case of the AfD.
Next, with the addition of two secondary cases, we can also control for
whether the institutional strategies of PRRPs is an effect of their status as
older ‘mainstreamed’ parties being close to power or newer ‘challenger’
parties on the fringe. In that scenario, we should observe the strategies of
the more mainstreamed FPÖ and DF to be relatively similar in acting as con-
senters to the centre-right out of not least coalitional concerns, whereas the
challenger status of the SD and AfD should make them converge on a reform
agenda that includes repeated attacks on union power. Altogether, if the
analysis across these four cases shows a pattern in consistency with our
claims, it indicates that the findings cannot be dismissed as artefacts of
case selection.
In the following two empirical sections, we conduct an in-depth analysis of
the strategies pursued by the Austrian FPÖ and the Danish DF in labour
market and social policy related institutional reforms. Differences in the insti-
tutional structures of the respective welfare states mean that we are looking
at areas that represent functional equivalents in providing institutional power
resources to trade unions. In the Austrian case, we focus on the corporatist
administration of the social insurance system, which provides trade unions
with a privileged influence in the policy-making process. In the Danish
case, we look at reforms of the administration of unemployment insurance
and active labour market policy, which also form an important recruitment
channel for trade unions (Ghent system). These are the respective areas of
union-held powerbases to which parties and governments with a preference
for imposing a loss of institutional benefits on unions should direct their
attention.
Our analysis draws on official documents, secondary sources, and inter-
view evidence. In each case, we analyse the policy positions and influences
of radical right parties in the reform process by relying on media sources,
press statements, parliamentary debates, and secondary sources. We also
conducted six interviews to gain deeper insights into the role of PRRPs in
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institutional reform, including four interviews with representatives of the DF
and FPÖ. The consulted primary sources, information on our interview evi-
dence and the secondary case studies can be found in in the Appendix.
Austria: strong party–union ties and a protagonist of union
attacks
A core feature of the Austrian political system is the close institutional and
personal linkage between the two historical major parties, the Social demo-
cratic party (SPÖ) and Christian democratic/Conservative People’s Party
(ÖVP), and the social partner camps from the labour and employer side
(Rathgeb, 2018, Chapter 3). The FPÖ has never managed to gain influence
in the political composition of the ÖGB and the Chamber of Labour. In
response, the FPÖ invented an own trade union confederation (FGÖ)
outside the established ÖGB in May 1998, which, however, still lacks the pre-
rogative to negotiate collective agreements and has recruited only a handful
members, mainly among police and prison officers. The party leadership
therefore quickly gave up on the idea to challenge the ‘red’ trade unions
through a unionist counter-organization (Interview I).
The anti-corporatist stance of the FPÖ turned into an anti-union stance
when the party came to form a coalition with the ÖVP that has traditionally
been aligned with the WKÖ. While the FPÖ consistently demanded to dis-
mantle compulsory membership in the Chamber system at the expense of
both organized labour and business when in opposition, the subsequent
reforms of the social insurance administration targeted the interest organiz-
ations of labour only, as the WKÖ could bet on the support of the business-
friendly ÖVP. According to Interviewee II, the FPÖ’s institutional reform
agenda had a power-strategic motive to weaken corporatist institutions,
because the party had always felt excluded from Austria’s social partnership
that rested on a close cooperation between the SPÖ and interest organiz-
ations of labour.
Attack no. 1: the social insurance reform 2000/01
‘Excessive welfare bureaucracy needs to be reduced, the corporatist self-
administration as a political self-service store abolished and the 28 social
insurance providers merged. […] The influence of the Chambers needs to
be suspended’ (Haider, 1993, p. 165). In these terms, Jörg Haider articulated
his demands for institutional reforms in the social insurance system as early
as 1993 in his political pamphlet Die Freiheit, die ich meine. The FPÖ has for-
mulated precisely the same proposals when entering government with the
ÖVP from 2000 to 2006 and from 2017 to 2019.
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Immediately after taking office, the government presented a comprehen-
sive institutional reform that (1) provided the FPÖ with a seat in a newly
created governing board of the social insurance (Verwaltungsrat) and (2)
restructured the balance of corporatist representation in favour of employer
representatives at the expense of union delegates (EIRO, 2001). As the social
insurance contributions of employees make up the largest part of the funding
structure, the ÖGB and BAK had previously dominated the administrative
structure of the Federation. In contrast to traditional consensus-seeking prac-
tices, the government relied on its parliamentary majority and precluded any
negotiations with the opposition and interest organizations of labour
(Obinger & Tálos, 2006, p. 85). While the Constitutional Court annulled
large parts of the government’s reform as it breached the principle of cor-
poratist self-administration, the government still managed to shift the
balance of power away from union delegates by achieving a parity in the rep-
resentation of union and employer delegates (Hofmarcher-Holzhacker, 2019,
p. 287).
In line with our expectations, the FPÖ legitimized its support for union dis-
empowerment in the social insurance by arguing that the Federation of Social
Insurance Providers should no longer be a powerhouse of Social democrats
(Stenographisches Protokoll, 2000, 146) and led by ‘hostile political function-
aries’ of the SPÖ-affiliated trade unions (Der Standard, 2000). It even accused
the Head of the Federation, Wilhelm Haberzettl, to have disguised fiscal
deficits in the social insurance in order to protect his Social democratic
allies in parliament prior to the 1999 election (Stenographisches Protokoll,
2000; 146, 190). To put it in counterfactual terms: If the union representatives
had not been tied to the SPÖ, the FPÖ would have had little grounds to justify
the institutional reform of the social insurance in 2000/2001.
Attack no. 2: the social insurance reform 2018
In 2017, when the FPÖ re-entered government with the ÖVP, it formulated
the very same proposals for institutional reform as in the year 2000: the abol-
ition of compulsory membership in the Chambers and the merging of the
regionally and occupationally fragmented 23 social insurance providers
that are based on corporatist self-administration (FPÖ-Wirtschaftsprogramm,
2017). Once again, the FPÖ was a consistent protagonist of attacks on insti-
tutional union power and went even beyond the reform proposals of the
business-friendly ÖVP.
The ÖVP under its Chancellor Sebastian Kurz prevented the abolition of
compulsory membership in the Chamber system, following previous state-
ments of the WKÖ’s president, Harald Mahrer, who had also been the
ÖVP’s chief negotiator in economic affairs during the 2017 coalition nego-
tiations (Der Standard, 02.11.2017). Notably, 63 percent of the electorate
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opposed the abolition of compulsory membership in the Chambers (Die
Presse, 22.11.2017). In a survey on compulsory membership in the
Chamber of Labour (BAK), 43 percent of FPÖ supporters confirmed the state-
ment that the abolition of compulsory membership in the BAK would be ‘det-
rimental’ to employees, whereas only 18 percent denied that and 39 percent
indicated to have no opinion on that matter (SWS-Umfrage, 2017, 9). The fact
that the FPÖ’s demand contradicted not only electoral majorities but also a
relative majority among its own supporters underscores the party’s role as
a protagonist of a long-term reform strategy against union power, regardless
of short-term public approval ratings.
Unlike the early 2000s, the ÖVP gave in to the FPÖ in exerting pressure on
the financial situation of the BAK. The government program required the
Chambers to reduce their expenditures in order to create leeway for a
reduction in compulsory membership fees in the interest of a lower tax
and contribution ratio. Whereas the WKÖ announced it could ‘live well’
with such a cut as it had already managed to reduce costs for its members,
the BAK reacted strongly against the government’s ultimatum (Kleine
Zeitung, 12.12.2017). It is interesting to note that the government could
unite around enhanced pressure on the BAK in particular, even though it is
one of the most trusted institutions in Austria, according to public opinion
surveys (APA/OGM Vertrauensindex 2019). The sudden and unexpected fall
of the government in the wake of the ‘Ibiza-Gate’ scandal prevented legisla-
tive changes in the funding of the BAK.
Yet, the ÖVP consented to the FPÖ’s long-standing demand to merge the
occupationally and regionally fragmented social insurance providers from 23
to only 5. Similar to the institutional re-organization in the early 2000s, the
reform implies a reduction in the influence of organized labour on corporatist
administration boards in favour of employers (Hofmarcher-Holzhacker, 2019).
The interest organizations of labour protested against this shift in the balance
of institutional power, whereas the government emphasized the efficiency-
enhancing effect of reducing the number of health insurance providers.
The Constitutional Court, once again, annulled parts of the reform, but the
enhanced role of employer representatives remained untouched. Similar to
the early 2000s, the FPÖ legitimized its institutional reform as a way of remov-
ing power from political functionaries that are considered more loyal to the
SPÖ and their patronage networks than the needs of patients in the health
care system (FPÖ-Parlamentsklub, 26.10.2018; 16.12.2019).
Denmark: relaxed party–union ties and a consenter to union
attacks
Affiliations between the group of establishment parties in Denmark and the
main economic actors have historically followed a well-known pattern.
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Coordinated decision-making offered excellent opportunities for the social
partners to achieve policy influence on matters of their concern and to
shape especially labour market institutions in concordance with corporatist
principles (cf. Nørgaard, 1997). Unlike in Austria, however, coordinated
decision-making declined from the beginning of the 1980s when a govern-
ment of the political right took office and held onto it until 1993. In response,
the unions could no longer rely on the Social democratic party and entered a
number of policy deals with the centre-right government in the late 1980s.
At the November 2001 election, the Danish People’s Party became the
third biggest party in parliament and came to serve as the parliamentary
base of support for a new minority coalition government consisting of the
Liberal party and the Conservative party. Months before the 2001 election,
the DF adopted a new party program that recognizes a political role for
Danish unions. But the party also recommended to the unions to separate
further from the Social democratic party (Dansk Folkeparti, 2001, 57–59).
The party did not announce direct attacks on the unions or corporatist insti-
tutions, but positioned itself as a reliable alternative partner for the unions
vis-à-vis an electorally decimated Social democratic party.
The relaxation of Social democratic party–union ties described in the
method section seems to have moderated the DF in relation to institutional
union power before it assumed government responsibility. As we will show
below, the DF was also a consenter to the centre-right’s institutional agenda
as the minority government’s support party by toning down attacks on
union power when they seemed to be unpopular in public opinion.
Cross-trade unemployment funds and a public option in
unemployment insurance
The Liberal-Conservative minority government zoomed in on possibilities to
curb union power resources associated with the Ghent-model and union-
controlled unemployment funds (cf. Rothstein, 1992). A reform was
announced in the new government program addressing directly the Ghent
model and the virtual union monopoly in the administration of unemploy-
ment insurance. The government would allow for cross-trade unemployment
funds and introduce a public option to lure workers away from union admi-
nistered unemployment funds (Regeringen, 2001, 2002a). The DF, the gov-
ernment’s parliamentary base of support, accepted cross-trade
unemployment funds, but prevented the legislation of a state-run public
option (Due & Madsen, 2007, p. 239). In the matter of a public unemployment
insurance fund, the party thus aligned with the trade unions (Folketingsti-
dende 2001-02: L123).
According to the then Social democratic spokesperson on labour market
policy, the reforms were driven forward by the new Liberal minister for
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employment with an outspoken anti-union stance rather than the DF (Inter-
view III). LO-Denmark expressed its dissatisfaction during the hearing pro-
cedure (LO 2002). The Social Democrats rejected the proposal, and
appealed to the DF to not support it, whom on their side justified support
for cross-trade unemployment funds as a matter of necessary renewal and
a general modernization of the unemployment insurance system (Folketing-
stidende 2001–02: L122).
Whereas the FPÖ mobilized political support for attacks against the insti-
tutional power resources of the SPÖ-affiliated union movement, the DF par-
tially aligned with the unions in avoiding direct competition from the state.
The strategy of the DF was designed to demonstrate that the party, on the
one hand, had moved away from the fringe and had the ability to serve as
a stable and responsible parliamentary support party for a centre-right min-
ority government. On the other hand, the DF also protected the unions’most
cherished institutional power resource by rejecting the establishment of a
state-administered unemployment insurance, which might have caused a
drop in support among working-class voters. Notably, in 2000 and 2008,
three quarters of nationwide representative surveys stated that access to
unemployment benefits should be a universal social right – an area that is
inextricably linked to union administration (Goul Andersen, 2011, p. 16).
During the reform process, the DF expressed an interest for an extended dia-
logue with organized labour, but on the condition that unions on their side
developed a more cooperative attitude toward other parties than the
Social democrats. In line with our definition of a consenter, the DF did not
initiate union-hostile institutional reforms; it reacted to the government’s
proposals by accepting one part of it while rejecting another.
Dismantlement of the public employment service
Almost simultaneously, the government waged a campaign against the cor-
poratist regulation of active labour market policy (ALMP) (Regeringen, 2002b;
Ministry of Employment, 2003). The government wanted to decentralize
ALMP authority to local governments and, by implication, circumvent cor-
poratist management and union influence. The issue became part of a
local government reform in 2004 (Regeringen, 2004). Not only unions, but
also the employers’ association, DA, would lose by such a reform, and the
two organizations forged a coalition with the Social democrats to prevent
it (DA et al., 2003).
In an effort to reach a broader compromise about the local government
reform, the government decided to negotiate the labour market part of it
in a separate process with the Social democrats. The DF did not participate
in these negotiations (Interview III). In fact, the DF labour market spokesper-
son at the time did not even seem to know about the existence of these
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separate negotiations (Interview IV). Despite some concessions (Interview I),
the Social democrats decided not to support the reform, which passed
with a minimal majority including only the government parties and the DF
(Regeringen & Dansk Folkeparti, 2004). Protests against the reform were
voiced from a united coalition of unions and employer organizations
(Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening et al., 2004).
A significant first step toward a local government-administered, non-cor-
poratist labour market administration was taken. This, however, was not a
deliberate institutional attack from the DF on unions, but a side effect of
DF’s support for a reform that dismantled the regional counties. The party
had called for abolishing this layer of government since it appeared as the
Progress Party in the early 1970s and cared less about the labour market
part (Interview IV, V). As the reform of ALMP administration was by no
means a salient issue in public opinion (Christiansen & Klitgaard, 2010), the
DF consented to the centre-right’s proposals and praised the reform for its
broader effect of delegating authority to municipalities. Five years later, the
DF once again accepted the government’s reform proposal that finally termi-
nated the corporatist national employment service against union protests (cf.
Ministry of Finance, 2008: 25, 57–60; Folketingstidende, 2008-09: L185; AE
Rådet, 2009).
The DF was a consenter rather than a protagonist to institutional reform, but
unlike in the area of unemployment insurance, the low salience of ALMP did
not create an incentive to put constraints on the centre-right’s initial
demands. The long-term interest of the centre-right to reduce union power
in labour market policy did not conflict with the short-term interest of the
DF to retain its appeal to working-class voters. In the same year as the national
employment service was finally abolished, the party stated in its party program
a potential to further adapt to the role of a trade union ally. The party acknowl-
edges the relaxation of party–union bonds and expresses that:
The vast majority of trade union members either votes for other political parties
or want to see trade unions liberated completely from party political ties. The
union’s unilateral retention to the Social Democrats exclude many competent
forces from engaging in professional union work such as being a union repre-
sentative. (Dansk Folkeparti 2009, p. 134–135; own translation)
In a context of relaxed party–union links, the radical right is not incen-
tivized to promote policies of direct attack against institutional union
power, as in the case of the FPÖ. The DF reacted to the agenda advanced
by the centre-right government and consented to parts of it while also
offering protection to the unions. The party balanced carefully between
the electoral concerns of working-class voters on issues of high salience
(i.e., the Ghent system) and coalitional concerns to keep the government
intact on issues of low salience (i.e., ALMP administration). The DF’s later
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offer to become a partner of the unions once Social democratic party–
union ties are further relaxed confirms our argument about the power-stra-
tegic motivation of PRRPs in relation to union power. In 2017, the DF
leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, announced to intensify cooperation with
the trade unions in a widely noted interview with the Social democratic
party chair, Mette Frederiksen, and the chair of the trade union for blue-
collar and (lower-skilled) service workers (3F), Per Christensen. While insti-
tutional reforms were no longer on the table in subsequent government
tenures, the DF supported a number of union-inclusive policy reforms
under both Liberal- and Social democratic-led governments in the 2010s.
This would be unthinkable in the adversarial context of Austria’s strong
party–union ties.
Our findings from the Austrian and Danish case sit well with our theoretical
propositions. At this stage, however, we cannot rule out (1) the possibly strong
influence of party-patronage in Austria or (2) the possibility that PRRPs develop
institutional strategies in dependence of their status as being either recent
challenger or older mainstream parties. To control for these alternative expla-
nations, we now turn to the review of two secondary cases.
Secondary cases: Sweden and Germany
Party–union ties are strong in Sweden (see Figure 1 in Appendix) and the
radical right party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), developed an attack-oriented
institutional strategy comparable to the one developed by the Austrian FPÖ
despite the absence of an Austrian-style party cartel characterized by party
patronage. As in Denmark, Ghent-organized unemployment funds and cor-
poratist decision-making in the implementation of Swedish labour market
policies are strong institutional assets of the Social democratic labour move-
ment (Rothstein, 1992). The SD have launched repeated attacks on the Ghent-
model and proposed to replace it with a public option financed out of general
taxes in 2010 (Sverigedemokraterna, 2010). Most recently, the proposal was
put forward in the 2018 election manifesto alongside an additional proposal
to dismantle the public employment service (Sverigedemokraterna, 2018, p.
10) and presented before the permanent parliamentary committee for labour
market policy. It was rejected by a majority led by the Social democrats
(Sveriges Riksdag: Motion till riksdagen 2019/20:811). Attacks from the SD
on institutional assets of the trade unions have been retaliated (LO, 2019).
LO-Sweden adopted in 2018 the resolution that being elected as a represen-
tative in a union under the confederation was incompatible with holding a
membership of the SD (Kindbom, 2018). There are no cracks in the
cooperation between the party and union in the Swedish labour movement,
and the SD responded with theoretically expected proposals to reform
16 P. RATHGEB AND M. B. KLITGAARD
institutional structures on which the Social democratic movement have
thrived politically. So far unsuccessfully.
As in Sweden, Germany has experienced the emergence of a radical right
party during the 2010s: the AfD. Unlike the SD, the AfD’s strategy lacks a clear
agenda, which resembles what we have observed in the case of Denmark. We
attribute this lack of agency to the fact that the AfD can gain much less from
institutional reforms than their counterparts in Sweden. Social democratic
party–union ties eroded with the SPD’s legislation of the union-hostile
Hartz reforms in the mid-2000s (see Figure 1 in Appendix). Trade union repre-
sentatives thus advocate for ‘situational coalitions with any partner willing to
cooperate – and not only with the SPD and Die Linke, but also with the CDU/
CSU and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – in order to maximize their direct or indirect
influence on policymaking’ (Spier, 2017, p. 147).
In the current legislative period since 2017, the AfD initiated three parlia-
mentary reform proposals on labour market reform; none of them would
have changed the administrative architecture of labour market policy. The
AfD proposed to (1) link the maximum duration of unemployment benefit
receipt to the individual contribution record of a job seeker (BT-Drucksache,
2019), (2) clarify the conditions of temporary employment (BT-Drucksache,
2018a) and (3) postpone the retirement age for the long-term unemployed
(BT-Drucksache, 2018b). The programmatic trajectory and parliamentary
activities suggest that the AfD places little emphasis on institutional
reforms (see Appendix). As the AfD has not entered government yet, we
do not know whether it would indeed play the role of a consenter when
assuming office. However, the party’s parliamentary record in opposition
shows it is not a protagonist of union attacks, as specified by our criteria
described in theoretical section. Let us recall that, unlike the AfD, the FPÖ
and SD did voice union-hostile reform proposals when in opposition, which
indicated their first-best preference against union power. The absence of a
salient anti-union agenda makes it more plausible to assume that the AfD
would either accept or modify reform proposals introduced by other
parties, similar to what we have observed in the case of the DF.
Table 2 illustrates how the cases of Germany and Sweden allow us to rule out
additional alternative explanations based on party patronage and party status in
favour of our argument about the role of Social democratic party–union ties.
Table 2. Alternative explanations, strength of party–union ties and dominant
institutional reform strategy.
FPÖ DF SD AfD
Party patronage Yes No No No
Party status Mainstream Mainstream Challenger Challenger
Party–union ties Strong Weak Strong Weak
Dominant strategy Protagonist Consenter Protagonist Consenter
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Conclusion
This paper has examined the institutional reforms of PRRPs, with a particular
focus on related impacts on union power. In doing so, our paper makes two
contributions to the existing literature on party politics, labour relations and
welfare state research: First, we showed that PRRPs are protagonists of attacks
on union power when Social democratic parties and trade unions have main-
tained strong organizational ties. In this way, PRRPs undermine the insti-
tutional power resources of an extra-parliamentary support base of their
parliamentary competitor for the working-class vote. By contrast, when
Social democratic parties are more loosely affiliated with trade unions,
PRRPs lack a long-term reform strategy geared against trade unions and
instead turn into consenters of attacks on union power in accordance with
short-term electoral and coalitional concerns.
Second, and related to this, we highlighted the difference between the
radical right and centre-right in institutional reforms of the welfare state.
Whereas centre-right parties pursue reductions in union power more gener-
ally (Jensen, 2014), the radical right’s agenda is conditional on the political
context of Social democratic party–union ties. The reason for this variation
is that the radical right no longer supports a neoliberal agenda that might
alienate its electoral base, which shifts their focus to the power-strategic
implications of institutional reforms in relation to those parties with which
they compete for the blue-collar working-class vote: the centre-left (Oesch
& Rennwald, 2018).
Our findings have important implications beyond the study of institutional
reform per se. Most clearly, they might call for a renewed attention to the
relationship between centre-left parties and trade unions (Allern et al.,
2017). Whereas power resource theory taught us that strong ties between
the political and industrial wing of the labour movement ensured mutual
gains (Korpi, 1983), our findings suggest that this is no longer the case. The
electoral decline and ideological transformation of Social democratic
parties has already provided trade unions with a clear signal that they
need to build flexible coalitions in order to influence policy-making. What
is more, an ongoing loyalty to their traditional allies may stimulate attacks
from the most successful party family of the past three decades at the
expense of precisely those institutional power resources that contributed
to their membership strength (Ghent system) and policy involvement (cor-
poratist power-sharing) in the first place. Differences in the strength of
party–union ties thus help explain the divergent resilience of institutional
union power. While the DF rescued the union-administered ‘Ghent system’
for the long-term, the FPÖ significantly reduced union power in the adminis-
tration of the social insurance system. Our tentative evidence from Sweden
and Germany resonates with this pattern.
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With the secondary case studies, we controlled for alternative explanations
and evaluated the validity of the argument beyond the primary cases of
Austria and Denmark. We observe an expected pattern across the four
cases, yet we cannot claim universal applicability of the argument we
advance. Notably, our cases are in the group of coordinated varieties of capit-
alism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), in which Social democratic parties in collabor-
ation with trade unions have shaped significant parts of the political
economy and thus the distribution of institutional power resources in cor-
poratist economic governance frameworks (Katzenstein, 1985). Hence, the
question of whether our findings hold beyond the corporatist cases of Con-
tinental and Northern Europe lies beyond the scope of this paper.
However, our argument relies on the generally accepted insight that the
distribution of institutional benefits and power resources incentivizes political
actors to either challenge or protect institutional arrangements (Knight, 1992;
Moe, 1990). While the content of associated political conflicts depends on the
institutional context, the inherently power-strategic logic of institutional
reforms is not confined to corporatist models of capitalism in Continental
and Northern Europe, but applies to the nature of partisan conflicts in the
welfare state domain more broadly (Klitgaard et al., 2015). Thus, we urge
future research to pay more attention to institutional reforms, because it
affects distributive coalitions and patterns of contestation in enduring
ways. Our paper contributes to this insight by pointing to the growing rel-
evance of radical right parties in shaping the institutional terrain for political
struggles, which will influence the future opportunities and constraints of
political parties and interest groups in the advanced capitalist democracies.
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